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Sales-Breach of Warranty and the Wrongful Death Statutes-ToRT CoNr
CEPT OF WARRANTY Is ExTENDED-ScAnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d
345, 195 N.W.2d 602 (1972).
The past few decades have seen the development of a trend in the field
of products liability that has increased the protection of the ultimate con-
sumer by expanding the duties and liabilities of the manufacturer and seller.1
This inclination has recently been extended by requiring manufacturers and
sellers to warrant the safety of their products, and by abrogating the neces-
sity of privity in most warranty actions.2 The result has increased the con-
sumer's chance of recovery for personal injury caused by a defective prod-
uct on the basis of negligence or breach of warranty. However, should the
consumer die from the injury, and the personal representative be unable to
prove neglig~n&e, it is questionable whether an action will lie for wrongful
death based on breach of warranty.3 This uncertainty exists because juris-
dictions differ over whether an action for breach of warranty may be
brought under their wrongful death statutes.4 While warranty is generally
considered contractual in nature, the majority of courts have construed the
wording of their statutes to be applicable only in tort."
In the recent case of Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co.,6 an automobile manu-
facturer and a dealer were sued for breach of warranty due to a death al-
legedly caused by a faulty seat belt. The Wisconsin Supreme Court per-
mitted recovery under its wrongful death statute.7 In so holding, the court
stated that death statutes are remedial and should, therefore, be broadly con-
strued to effect their purpose." Recognizing the tortious nature of the action
1 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which
held that the duty of a manufacturer to a consumer did not rest on their contractual
relationship but on the foreseeability of harm arising out of the manufacturer's affrma-
tive conduct in placing the product on the market. See also Pierce v. Ford Motor Co,
190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951); Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949); W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Note, Breach of Warranty as a Basis for a Wrongful Death Action, 51 IowA L. REV.
1010, 1012 & nn. 16, 17 & 18 (1966); see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 NJ. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) which held that privity of contract was not necessary to hold a
manufacturer and dealer liable for personal injuries resulting to the vendee's wife.
3 51 IowA L. REv., supra note 2, at 1013.
4 See 12 AM. Jum. Trmts Wrongful Death Actions § 13 (1966); 5 FLA. L. REv. 344,
345 (1952).
5 51 IowA L. REV., supra note 2, at 1016 & n. 50. Most American death statutes follow
the wording of Lord Campbell's Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, which provides that
an action can be maintained for "any wrongful act, neglect or default" that causes death.
0 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 602 (1972).
7 Id. at 354, 195 N.W.2d at 610.
8 Id. at 350, 195 N.W.2d at 606.
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of breach of warranty,9 the Wisconsin court had no trouble in discerning
the car dealer's breach of implied warranty of fitness as a wrongful act,
neglect, or default under its wrongful death statute.
,Many of the jurisdictions whose reasoning has run contra to Wisconsin's
holding tend to interpret their own death statutes strictly,", and often state
that culpability or tortious conduct is required before a suit can be brought."
Other courts have held that the language of their statutes would have to
be.unduly strained and extended to encompass breaches of warranty. 12 Al-
though some of these jurisdictions have statutes worded somewhat differently
from Wisconsin's,' 3 others have quite similar language. 14 It appears, how-
ever, that all such jurisdictions indicate that an action for breach of warranty
lies clearly in contract; few are willing to recognize its tortious nature.15
9 Id. at 353, 195 N.W.2d 609 n.3. The Wisconsin court cited with approval Prosser's
statement that, "regardless of the form of action, . . . the tort aspects of warranty call
for the application of a tort rather than a contract rule in various respects." W. PROSSR,
HANDBooic OF Tm LAW OF TORTS § 121 (3d ed. 1964).
10 See Gott v. Newark Motors, Inc., 267 A.2d 596 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970). The court
held that "an action for wrongful death based upon breach of implied warranty, ... is
not such action as is embraced within the terms 'negligence' or 'unlawful violence'. Id.
at 599. Barley's Adm'x v. Clover Splint Coal Co., 286 Ky. 218, 150 S.W.2d 670 (1941)
stated that the death act is confined to torts and does not cover a case of breach of
ordinary contract; Kratochvil v. City of Grayling, 367 Mich. 682, 117 N.W.2d 164
(1962); Post v. Manitowoc Eng'r. Corp., 88 N.J. Super. 199, 211 A.2d 386 (1965). See
also Home v. Armstrong Prods. Corp., 416 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1969); Goelz v. J. K. &
Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. &-Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Civ. App. Tex. 1961).
,11 Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 259 N.E.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1970). The right
of action is "statutory and is based either upon negligence or upon a wilful, wanton or
reckless act causing death;" therefore, no recovery can be allowed from an automobile
dealer on the "basis of breach of warranty. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 161 A. 385
(Conn. 1932). Recovery is limited to injuries resulting in death from negligent, willful,
malicious, or felonious act; Whiteley v. Webb's City Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951).
Florida has since amended its wrongful death statute to encompass specifically both ex
delicto and ex contractu actions.
12 DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d 283 (1965) contained
a strong dissent by Roberts and Musmans, J. J., which stated that the majority took an
unduly restricted view of the wrongful death statute. See Sacks v. Creasy, 211 F. Supp.
859 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Frankel v. Styer, 201 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
13 See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 37, § 3704 (b) (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-311 (1948);
Ky. Rxv. STAT. tit. 36, § 411.130 (1948); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.711 (1935); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953).
14See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1951); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1950); TFX. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 4672 (1948).
15 Sugai v. General Motors Corp, 130 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Idaho 1955). In this case of
first impression, the District Court in Idaho stated that "it is widely recognized that
death statutes of this sort generally are ex delicto and not ex contractu in nature. There-
fore, it will not suffice in this action for plaintiffs merely to allege a breach of implied
warranty of fitness or of merchantability." Id. at 103. See generally, Sterling Alum.
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Nevertheless, a few jurisdictions have recognized the tortious nature of
warranty and have consequently allowed actions for breach of warranty to
be brought under their death statutes. New York was one of the first juris-
dictions to allow such an action, 6 and several other jurisdictions have as-
cribed to her reasoning.' 7 These jurisdictions hold that breach of warranty.
is in many respects an action in tort, and whether in tort or contract, there
is a default or breach that constitutes the violation of a duty to another.'8
This violation is a wrongful act, and clearly comes within the wrongful
death statutes. This same reasoning, followed in California' 9 and Minnesota&
in holding airplane manufacturers liable in death actions for breach of war-
ranty, has been extended more recently into the area of implied warranties
in cases involving automobile manufacturers. 21
By allowing an action for breach of warranty to arise under its wrongful
death statute, Wisconsin has reflected the growing trend of deciding prod-
ucts liability cases on the basis of the new principle of strict liability in tort,
rather than the traditional theory of implied warranty.2 This trend has
Prods. Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1944); Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Wood-
son Sanitarium Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d 367, 368 (1928).
16 Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co, 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N2E.2d 557 (1938). The New York Court
of Appeals said that "the distinction between torts and breaches of contract is, ofttimes,
so dim and shadowy that no clear line of deliniation may be observed.... Recovery
is not conditioned on definition nor measured by determination of whether it is
grounded in a violation of a duty owing to another or in a breach of a contractual
obligation." Id. at 561. In this case there was a duty to see that the food was fit for
human consumption, and although the action could have been brought for breach of
warranty, "the breach is a wrongful act, a default, and, in its essential nature, a tort."
Accord, Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.YS.2d 942 (1969); Calamari v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., 3 Misc. 2d 780, 155 N.Y.S.2d
552, 553 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
17 See, e.g., Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 III. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303
(1961); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co, 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); cf. Kernan
v. American Dredging Co, 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
Is See notes 16 & 17 supra.
'9 Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); accord,
Goldberg v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).2oEwing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962).
21 Kelley v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 268 A.2d 837 (N.H. 1970). In this
case in which a car overturned killing the driver, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
said "that the administrator of an estate can maintain an action for breach of warranty
allegedly resulting in death of his decedent and that count based on strict liability
alleges a good cause of action." Id. at 837. Accord, Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co.,
344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965), which noted that a defect in a tire caused by an act or
omission of the manufacturer or designer of the tire was a wrongful act or omission
within the Indiana death statute; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th
Cir. 1959).22 See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Wetherspoon, Torts or War-
ranties, 73 Com. L. J. 134 (1968).
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been encouraged by the tendency to eliminate the requirement of privity
of contract in warranty cases, since this elimination serves to strip warranty
of its contractual nature.23 Those jurisdictions that agree with the Wisconsin
court have recognized that warranty without privity of contract is in fact
a matter of tort. By applying the theory of strict liability in tort, these
jurisdictions have found no reason why an action for breach of warranty
will not lie under their wrongful death statutes. 24
The important considerations are that a tort duty arises out of the rela-
tionship of the parties when an implied warranty is involved,2 5 and that
the death statutes are intended to compensate those damaged by a breach
of this duty. Schnabl has recognized the tort duty that arises in the case of
a car dealer who impliedly warrants that the parts of a car are free from
defects possibly harmful to its user. The Wisconsin court noted the illogic
of those jurisdictions that allow contract theories of warranty to prevent the
bringing of breach of warranty actions under their wrongful death statutes.
In this case of first impression, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly indi-
Cated its agreement with the growing concept of strict liability in tort, and
showed that the recognition of the tortious nature of warranty should log-
ically extend to any case where the warranty results in a duty owed by one
t6 another. The court refused to allow archaic concepts of warranty to
prohibit a deserving plaintiff from recovery under its death statute.
This line of reasoning is consistent with the recent trend to protect the
ultimate consumer and to provide compensation for those injured by defec-
tive products. Those jurisdictions that refuse to allow warranty actions
under their death statutes do so because of their continuing deference to
the aging concept of warranty as a contract that runs- with the goods or
requires privity.28 Little justification for this view exists today; nevertheless,
the concept continues to hinder the recognition of strict tort liabiliy, pre-
venting some courts from carrying out the intent of modern products lia-
bility legislation.27
": The Schnabl decision should be significant to Virginia, because Virginia
has not yet had the opportunity to decide whether an action for breach of
28See Generally Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products
Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982 (1962).
24 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 102 (4th ed. 1971).
25 The Greco case first recognized this tort duty in the case of breach of warranty
as to the fitness of food for consumption; following cases began to perceive the same
duty with regard to mechanical devices. 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
26 See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, 631-40. In 1778, the first decision was reported in
which a plaintiff proceded in contract theory, Thereafter, warranty gradually came to
be considered as a term of the contract of sale for which the normal remedy would be
a contract action,
27 See note 22 supra.
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warranty will lie under its death statute. Whether Virginia would allow
such an action will depend on the interpretation of its statute, and more
important, on how it views the nature of a breach of warranty action. The
wording of Virginia's Death by Wrongful Act Statute 8 is similar to Wis-
consin's and should pose no problem, although it is unclear from past deci-
sions whether Virginia recognizes the tortious nature of warranty. While
Virginia has followed the trend of eliminating the requirement of privity
of contract in warranty actions, it has framed its Products Liability Act
within section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It has been sub-
mitted that by so doing the Virginia Legislature has directed the courts to
use the Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code to govern the scope,
conditions, and remedies available in breach of warranty actions. 30 There-
fore, Virginia has apparently suggested that the Uniform Commercial Code
approach to warranties is preferable to the strict liability in tort theory.31
Also, in a number of cases involving the joining of causes of action, the
decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court would apparently indicate that
the court considers breach of implied warranty as an ex eontractu action.
2 8 VA. CODE Am. § 8-633 (Cum. Supp. 1972). The statute creates an action for
death caused by "wrongful act, neglect or default."
2 9VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1950). The Virginia Products Liability Act eliminates
the defense of lack of privity when an action is brought to recover damages for breach
of warranty or negligence even though the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from
the defendant, if the "plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might
reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods." See also VA.
CoDE Ai. § 8-654.4 (Cum. Supp. 1972), which provides that "[in [all other] cases
... where recovery of damages for injury to person, including death, or to property
resulting from negligence is sought, lack of privity between the parties shall be no
defense."30 See Spiedel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965).
31 Id. at 852.
32 See eg., Daniels v. Truck & Equip. Corp, 205 Va. 579, 139 S.E.2d 31 (1964). The
plaintiff brought suit for damages for breach of warranty to repair and replace defective
parts, and for wrongful repossession. The court held that the motion for judgement was
demurrable for misjoinder of contract and tort actions. Blythe v. Camp Mfg. Co., 183
Va. 432, 32 S.E.2d 659 (1945); Kroger Grocery & Bakery Co. v. Dunn, 181 Va. 390, 25
S.E.2d 254 (1943) held that a motion charging breach of warranty for fitness of food
and negligence in handling the food was demurrable As joining actions in contract and
in tort. Although these decisions turned on the fact that the causes of action did not
arise from the same transaction, the holdings suggest that Virginia still perceives the
action for breach of warranty as lying in contract only. Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy C.,
166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936). But cf. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Universil
Moulded Prods. Corp., 191 Va. 525, 62 S.E.2d 233 (1950). See also Brockett v. Harrell
Bros. Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965), wherein the court ruled that because an
action by a consumer against a food processor and retailer for breach of an implid
warranty of fitness was ex contractu, contributory negligence was not a defense.
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded from the above that Virginia would
fail to realize the tortious nature of breach of warranty under all circum-
stances. For example, in deciding which statute of limitations is applicable
in an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from breach of implied
warranty, the Virginia Supreme Court held that regardless of whether an
action is in tort or contract, it is the object of the action that determined
which statute of limitations would apply.3 Furthermore, the Federal Dis-
trict Court in applying Virginia law has held that breach of warranty for
seaworthiness is not contractual in nature but lies in the field of tort liability.8
Consequently, it does seem possible that Virginia could apply the same
reasoning in an implied warranty action under the death statute.
With the growing acceptance of strict tort liability in warranty cases,
it would seem that Virginia would benefit by separating its Products Liabil-
ity Act from the Uniform Commercial Code.ss The Code laws only tend to
restrict Virginia courts from carrying out the true purpose of the act with
regard to warranties. The logic of allowing breach of warranty actions
under the wrongful death statute should weigh heavily in a state that has
extended warranties from the manufacturer and seller to any reasonable
user of the product in the absence of privity of contract between the two.
A refusal to allow such an action would be a step backward for Virginia,
and would be contrary to the intent of recent legislation that has increased
the protection of the ultimate consumer. It can be reasoned with some
justification that by its elimination of the requirement of privity in war-
ranty actions, the Virginia legislature has begun to perceive warranty as
a duty imposed by law as a matter of public policy.36 With this realization,
the court should have no difficulty in viewing a breach of warranty action
as ex delicto and, therefore, maintainable under Virginia's death statute. Vir-
ginia has been progressive in following the modem trends in consumer
protection, and hopefully will follow the reasoning of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court and refuse to allow outmoded contract ideas of warranty to
prevent just compensation in wrongful death atcions.
F.J.H.
33 Birmingham v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 98 Va. 548, 37 S.E. 17 (1900) noted that
where one complains of injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsit is the same
as if the action was ex delicto. The court said that "the object of the suit at bar being
to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff,
the limitation in tort actions is applicable."
84 Dawson v. Fernly & Eger, 196 F. Supp. 816 (ED. Va. 1961).
85 See Emroch, Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: One Hundred Years of Products
Liability Law, 4 UNIv. oF Ricm. L. REv. 155 (1970).
36 See note 23 smpra.
